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Abstract
Modern human rights theory is increasingly susceptible to 
politicization in a manner that debilitates its enforcement- 
particularly in third world nations and the Eastern bloc. 
Seen by many as a tool of western imperialism and a 
banner of democratic crusade, it is mistrusted by those 
who could otherwise benefit greatly from its advocacy 
and implementation. This article aims at exploring the 
challenges of human rights’ sociological marketability in 
light of these issues. More specifically, it attempts to address 
the problem of sociological marketability of human rights 
in increasing religiously and culturally pluralistic globalized 
society by examining the deep entrenchment of modern 
human rights theory within its roots of Western political 
philosophy and challenges that such limitations cause, 
arguing that there is no better way to ensure the survival 
of human rights doctrine than to depart fromWestern 
individual-centric view that finds itself incompatible with 
eastern religious and ethical systems and cultures.  
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INTRODUCTION
An ever-present problem within human rights theory is 
that of philosophical foundations and moral legitimization. 
Though this overshadowing dilemma sheds light upon 
the intellectual roots of human rights doctrine, it does 
so at the expense of stagnating practicability in terms of 
international adherence, thereby causing a discrepancy 
between theory and practice. The defense of dignity 
that is the basis of human rights doctrine, historically 
separated from its religious roots through the phases of 
the Enlightenment period and the UDHR, finds itself 
conceptually vulnerable and defenseless in the midst of 
a growing religiously and culturally pluralistic world. 
Though its drafters had good intentions in giving strategic 
importance to language in formulating the UDHR, in 
hoping to create a vehicle for human rights that would 
transcend individual difference, they did so in a manner 
that left human rights morally ungrounded. Martin 
describes this mechanistic tactic in writing, 
After World War II, the drafters of the various international 
human rights instruments…used secular language to rise above 
the particularities of individual religious and ethical traditions. 
The word “nature,” for example, was preferred to the word God. 
The drafters postulated a common understanding of “human 
dignity” as evidence of a universal commitment to the “equal 
and inalienable rights of all member of the human family.” Once 
approved, tensions again arose between religiously based ethical 
traditions and definitions of a common/secular morality…”.
(Martin, 2005, p.828) 
This article aims at exploring the challenges of human 
rights’ sociological marketability in light of these issues, 
using the arguments of Donnelly and Twiss as the 
backdrop of discussion of human rights as a self-existing 
holistic normative structure that enjoys universal moral 
consensus, Beitz’s criticism of natural rights as a basis 
for human rights doctrine, and Martin and An-Naim’s 
advocacy of cooperation between human rights, religion, 
and- in the case of the latter-secularism. 
1.  LITERATURE REVIEW
One important aspect of Donnelly’s approach to human 
rights theory involves the idea of ‘historical contingency’ 
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(2003, p.1) - specifically in discussing his argument for the 
compatibility of universal rights with specific historical 
processes of change. An-Naim’s argument of the synergy 
of human rights, religion, and secularism will do more to 
shed light on this topic, though to a lesser extent than the 
theoretical approach of Martin. But before discussing the 
importance of making human rights doctrine more tolerant 
of religious and/or non-Western views, it is necessary 
to examine Donnelly’s perspective of philosophical 
foundations and the problems that a lack of international 
agreement thereupon might or might not pose. Doing so, 
with the help of Twiss’s advocacy of human rights as an 
effective global ethic, will clarify the idea of human rights 
doctrine as a universal normative structure that can stand 
alone.
Donnelly describes human rights doctrine as entailing 
both a “moral universality’ and an “international 
normative universality” (2003, p.1). For our purposes, it is 
only necessary to clarify the latter descriptor. He writes, 
[Human rights] are almost universally accepted, at least in 
word, or as ideal standards. All states regularly proclaim their 
acceptance of and adherence to international human rights 
norms, and charges of human rights violations are among 
the strongest complaints that can be made in international 
relations. Three quarters of the world’s states have undertaken 
international legal obligations to implement these rights by 
becoming parties to the International Human Rights Covenants, 
and almost all other nations have otherwise expressed approval 
of and commitment to their content (2003, p.1).
 It is interesting that near universal consensus can 
be made with so little agreement on philosophical 
foundations. Donnelly himself, while describing this 
lack of agreement, does not seem to find in it a problem 
for human rights theory. With his discussion rooted in a 
synopsis of differing views on human nature, he discusses 
the challenges of attempting to encapsulate human rights 
theory with any particular vision, whether that be of 
Aristotle’s “political animal,” Marx’s creative material-
driven individual, or Kant’s rational human being (2003, 
pp.16-17). He posits, rather, that though some argue for 
needs-based rights (2003, p.13)…  
The source of human rights is man’s moral nature, which is only 
loosely linked to the “human nature” defined by scientifically 
ascertainable needs. The “human nature” that grounds human 
rights is a prescriptive moral account of human possibility. The 
scientists’ human nature says that beyond this we cannot go. The 
moral nature that grounds human rights says that beneath this 
we must not permit ourselves to fall (2003, p.14).
In The Three Monotheistic World Religions and 
International Human Rights, J. Paul Martin argues that 
only international human rights standards can provide 
mutual understanding and reconciliation among the 
Abrahamic religions in allowing them to arrive at a 
general consensus on social norms. He does so by a) 
examining their historical propensity for change as 
respective religious traditions and b) attempting to provide 
empirical evidence that religiosity is not necessarily 
inherently linked with prejudice. By separating core 
religious beliefs of cultural adaptations that oftentimes 
clash with modern conceptions of human rights, each 
tradition can reexamine its own codes and thereby 
coexist alongside its Abrahamic counterparts. He first 
provides a brief history of the international human 
rights doctrine and its religious roots, showing how both 
have been intertwined since the modern conception of 
human rights.  Referencing Western Europe’s 450 year 
challenge of religious authority-based social ethics, i.e. 
the Enlightenment period that birthed philosophies such 
as John Locke’s natural rights doctrine, he shows how 
the 1948 UDHR came to serve after World War II as 
a response to the secularization of ethical ideas, with 
drafters such as Eleanor Roosevelt substituting words 
like “nature” for God in trying to create a universal 
meaning system that would overlook individual cultural 
and religious differences. Martin illustrates religion 
and human rights’ historical interdependence by 
providing examples such as Martin Luther’s defense 
of the freedom of conscience against the Roman 
Catholic Church and the religiously-fueled 18th century 
antislavery movement.  He also discusses their mutual 
critique of one another.  Human rights have often seen 
religion as oppressive, exclusive, and prejudicial.  For 
example, the Catholic Church does not allow women 
to become priests, the Great Inquisition allowed the 
Church to use civil powers to forcefully proselytize; 
even within religions there are divisions that make us 
question religious traditions’ stances on human rights. 
Religion seems to thrive on exclusivity; namely, the 
self-affirming otherness it preaches. Religion, just as 
well, has its issues with human rights, oftentimes seeing 
human rights doctrine as ungodly, ethnocentric, and a 
tool for Western imperialism.  Examples such as women 
in the priesthood and Shariah in Saudi Arabia serve to 
show how many religious communities see religion 
as overriding international human rights, claiming the 
latter to be outside of its jurisdiction in meddling with 
internal affairs (see examples of Russian Orthodox 
Church’s “Social Concept” and Cairo Declaration of 
Human Rights in Islam). Nonetheless, using examples 
such as the abolition of slavery, women’s rights, and 
the Church of Christ’s endorsement of human rights, 
Martin argues that changes have indeed occurred within 
religious communities over time, which give hope to 
the possibility of religion’s arrival at a common ethical 
position through human rights.  In order to achieve 
mutual consensus, religious must separate their core 
beliefs from cultural adaptations; doing so will show that 
they cover much of the same moral ground in dealing 
with issues of social justice, equality, and human dignity- 
without having to give up their own respective identities.
Before looking at these authors’ approaches, it is 
important to touch upon Beitz’s criticism of natural 
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rights as a basis for human rights doctrine, given this 
article’s argument that the latter must learn to expand 
its identification, if not break away altogether, from its 
Western oriented political philosophy roots as deeply 
entrenched in the Enlightenment period. Doing so 
will also bring to light Beitz’s view of the historical 
contingency. 
Previously mentioned is the departure of human rights 
theory from its religious roots through a multiphase 
process covering the Enlightenment defense of human 
dignity rooted in a rational order of being as illustrated 
through the work of Locke as well as the formulation 
of the UDHR. Beitz describes, in addition to this, and 
with specific regard to the problem of philosophical 
foundations, the contrast between religion and human 
rights- or, to be more exact, between a rights-based 
universal order and modern human rights doctrine. He 
writes, 
[The idea] that natural rights have some sort of permanent 
existence in a separate normative order…is difficult to render 
clearly…for it is explicit in the origins of this practice that 
human rights doctrine does not incorporate any view about the 
justification of human rights in an independent order of natural 
rights, in the natural law, or in God’s commands (2009, p.54). 
Beitz moves on to his criticism of natural rights as a 
basis for human rights given this discrepancy, focusing 
on the fact that natural rights involve an element of 
‘timelessness’- i.e. “that their requirements are invariant 
across time and space” (2009, p.57). He argues- as we 
will see, similar to Donnelly, Martin, and An-Naim- 
that human rights, unlike natural rights, are historically 
contingent, writing, 
International human rights are not even prospectively 
timeless. They are appropriate to the institutions of modern or 
modernizing societies organized as political states coexisting in 
a global political economy in which human beings face a series 
of predictable threats. As the social, economic, and technological 
environment evolves, the array of threats may change. So, 
perhaps, may the list of human rights…. (2009, p.58)
Here, once again, we see an emphasis on human rights 
as historically contingent rather than engulfed in a limiting 
sphere of “timelessness” such as that criticized by Beitz; 
this across-the-board notion of historical contingency is 
especially important in supporting this article’s argument 
that human rights theory itself must evolve away from 
its roots in Western political philosophy so as to appeal 
to more solidaristic cultures, religions, and political 
communities of the Eastern bloc and the third world and 
thereby increase its marketability; it must do so without 
diluting itself completely of its Western origins while 
simultaneously expanding itself to become more inclusive. 
Its most sure way of doing this is through applying a 
theoretical understanding of the mutual historical reliance 
of religion and human rights similar to that illustrated by 
Martin with the practical “synergistic” model proposed by 
An-Naim.  
2.  RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA
This study used qualitative analysis to assess current 
human rights doctrine with specific regard to the issue 
of foundations. Specifically, it relied on developments 
in human rights theories proposed by: An-Na’im, Beitz, 
Donnelly, Martin and Twiss. The idea that universal 
human rights is susceptible to historical change- and is 
itself a historically changing subject- is a recurring theme 
that was explored throughout this article, particularly in 
the works of Donnelly, Beitz, Martin, and An-Naim. 
Indeed, Donnelly’s previously mentioned idea of 
“historical contingency” is important to emphasize 
especially in light of this article’s call for human rights 
doctrine to become more expansive so as to increase its 
international pluralistic sociological marketability. Once 
again, it is important to note how, interestingly, near 
universal consensus can be made with so little agreement 
on philosophical foundations. By international normative 
universality, Donnelly refers to the general acceptance 
of the human rights doctrine by the international 
community either through direct or indirect subscription. 
As previously mentioned, Donnelly looks at this lack of 
agreement on philosophical foundations as one of human 
rights’ positive attributes. He perhaps naively goes out on 
a limb in doing so, in that he underestimates the diligent 
skeptic’s criticisms, but nonetheless argues that “Moral 
arguments can be both uncertain in their foundations and 
powerful in their conclusions and applications…Whatever 
their limits, substantive theories of human rights are both 
necessary and possible” (2003, p.21).
Twiss’s approach to human rights theory is similar 
in that he sees human rights doctrine as self-sufficient 
in that it can stand alone as its own “global ethic”; 
this is of particular importance in light of this article’s 
argument that a discrepancy between theory and practice 
is created by an overemphasis on moral legitimization and 
philosophical foundations- that in order for human rights 
doctrine to stand alone, it must do so without constantly 
needing to reinvent itself; indeed, it must make a clean 
break from the traditional philosophical foundations that, 
upon scrutiny, cannot hold. Twiss, like Donnelly, sees 
human rights doctrine as self-sufficient. He writes, 
It is certainly well and good to speak of the development of a 
global ethic, but it seems more than prudent to recognize that 
this ethic has in fact been emerging over the past six decades 
precisely in the human rights movement…It also seems prudent 
to build upon what we have already achieved rather than 
reformulating over and over again the same moral points that we 
have already agreed upon. (Twiss, 2011, p.220)
Both Donnelly and Twiss argue for a self-sufficient 
human rights doctrine that can stand alone apart from any 
sort of internationally agreed upon moral or philosophical 
foundation. Though their positions are well-defended, 
they ignore the barrier posed by cultural relativism and 
religion in relation to human rights doctrine. This is 
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particularly the case in contrasting Donnelly’s individual-
centric view of human rights in the Eastern, more 
collective, solidaristic approach of An-Naim or the argued 
compatibility of religion and human rights posited by 
Martin.
Martin argues that “common standards are necessary to 
govern relationships among religions and that international 
human rights standards best play that role” (Martin, 
2005, p.827). As previously mentioned, he illustrates 
religion and human rights’ historical challenges and 
interdependence by providing examples such as Martin 
Luther’s defense of the freedom of conscience against the 
Roman Catholic Church (Martin, 2005, p.832), the 18th 
century antislavery movement (Martin, 2005, p.827), and 
the use of the Catholic Church to forcefully proselytize 
throughout the Great Inquisition (Martin, 2005, p.832), 
among others.  Martin argues that changes have indeed 
occurred within religious communities over time, giving 
hope to the possibility of religion’s arrival at a common 
ethical position through human rights. In order to achieve 
mutual consensus, religions must “[distinguish] between 
cultural adaptations on one hand, and core beliefs and 
moral standards on the other” (Martin, 2005, p.840). Here 
we see an emphasis on the historical contingency not only 
of human rights, but of religion itself. One of Martin’s 
analysis’ strengths includes the fact that it focuses not 
only on the monotheistic religions’ connection through 
common social concepts such as human dignity, equality, 
and social justice in order to help reconcile them but also 
stresses the need to “take into account the impact of their 
respective political and social contexts showing that just 
as changes have taken place in the past, so changes in the 
future could lead to improved relationships among them” 
(Martin, 2005, p.829). 
An-Naim approaches human rights doctrine more 
practically in setting out an ideal framework for mutual 
cooperation between religion, human rights, and 
secularism. He argues that “each of the three tends toward 
transformation in favor of the other two. Each needs the 
other two to fulfill its own rationale and to sustain its 
relevance and validity for its own constituency” (An-
Na’im, 2005, p.56). Rather than envisioning a prospective 
mutual cooperation between religion and human rights, 
An-Naim argues that all three components are mutually 
dependent upon one another. 
Overall, this article found that modern human 
rights theory is becoming increasingly susceptible to 
politicization in a manner that debilitates its enforcement- 
particularly in third world nations and the Eastern bloc. 
Seen by many as a tool of Western imperialism and a 
banner of democratic crusade, it is mistrusted by those 
who could otherwise benefit greatly from its advocacy 
and implementation. If human rights doctrine is to enjoy 
self-sufficient modern hegemony, it must delimit itself 
from its Enlightenment roots in becoming more expansive 
and open toward Eastern cultural, religious, and political 
world views. 
CONCLUSION
This article has attempted to address the problem of the 
marketability of human rights in an increasing religiously 
and culturally pluralistic globalized society. It has 
examined the deep entrenchment of modern human rights 
theory within its roots of Western political philosophy 
and the challenges that such limitations cause, arguing 
that there is no better way to ensure the survival of 
human rights doctrine than to depart from the Western 
individual-centric view that finds itself incompatible with 
eastern religious and ethical systems and cultures. Human 
rights doctrine must learn to expand its identification, 
if not break away altogether, from its Western oriented 
political philosophy roots as deeply entrenched in the 
Enlightenment period. In other words, it must become 
more expansive so as to increase its international 
pluralistic sociological marketability. In doing so, it 
will inadvertently become less particular toward rights 
that fall under the umbrella of capitalist democracy and 
simultaneously depoliticize to the point of sociological 
malleability. Doing so is not an option that will lead- 
as a reward of philosophical endeavor- to its greater 
legitimacy but is, rather, necessary for its legitimate 
survival.
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